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The role of the Vice-President as sort of a political hit-man is one of
about three functions that he seems to serve during the campaign, the
others being sort of an echo of the Presidential candidate, and the third
as the chief celebrator of the Presidential candidate's credentials and
virtues. [What is missing is a serious campaign showing his own
abilities, as well as serious public scrutiny of him.]
Part of the problem we have in the election of Vice-Presidents is that
to begin with very few people or relatively few people know who the
Vice-Presidential candidates are. Polls were taken in 1944 and 1948
showing that relatively more people in Britain than people in the
United States knew who the candidates for Vice-President were. I
assume this has changed somewhat.
A further point, I think, is that Vice-Presidential candidates are
really rarely accorded front-page media treatment. I went through
some of the New York Times and Washington Posts for the past 24
years and looked at how often a Vice-President is discussed on page
one. It really comes down to Presidential candidates making front-page
news about ten or eleven times for every time that the VicePresidential candidate does. On the rare occasion when he does make
the front page, it seems to be because he has made some ethnic
comment or he has called somebody a Communist or something has
come out about personal funds, or things like this.
In terms of institutional reforms, I am not sure there is much that
can really be done, aside from Governor Peabody's suggestion or
Senator Griffin's suggestion. To me, the type of proposal that the
Harvard study group made is appealing in the sense that it is sort of a
non-institutional change and along these lines I think, as Ira Jackson
said earlier, the fact that Vice-Presidential debates happened this year
was a very healthy thing in that it did cause people to look at the
Vice-Presidential candidates for a change and gave them a forum in
which to consider their Presidential qualifications, and that may have
been a factor in the election. I think unless something like this becomes
a regular feature, unless the media concentrate more attention on this
sort of problem, the current system really is going to continue to
encourage the same sort of behavior in Vice-Presidential candidates as
it has in the past.
III.
*. .

CONDUCT OF THE OFFICE: DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS

VOICE:

Neil Hammond, Public Radio. Professor Schlesinger

has talked about the Vice-Presidential role. I would like to ask the
members with Senatorial experience whether they think, realistically,
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the legislative role of the Vice-President should be increased and I
would like to ask Mr. Reedy and Mr. Kirbo whether they think the
executive role of the Vice-President should be increased.
MR. FEERICK: I would like to ask Senator Smith to respond.
SENATOR SMITH: I would say no. I would say that the Vice-

President is sort of waiting for the President and should continue in
that way and not have his legislative rule expanded.
DEAN REEDY: As to the executive role, I would say only in an
artsycraftsy sense. In other words, the Vice-President is going to do
whatever the President hands him to do, which can be taken away the
following day.
He has one or two statutory duties, as you know. He is Chairman of
the Space Council, under which the President listens or doesn't listen,
depending on how he feels. He sits on the National Security Council,
which is like sitting in on a Javanese temple dance. I think he has got
one or two other minor things.
But the answer is: no, all executive power is in the hands of the
President, and it is inconceivable that you could have a Vice-President
who had a separate political base, which he would have to have.
SENATOR SMITH: The framers of the Constitution were very wise
in that respect.
DEAN REEDY: They knew what they were doing.
VOICE:
Would Mr. Kirbo have any comments?
MR. KIRBo: I am going to have to reserve my judgment for a
couple of years. Governor Carter and Senator Mondale are making a
determined and so far successful effort to work together. Senator
Mondale is having an input in the selection of the Cabinet and in the
development of names for consideration. It has been a very helpful and
a very congenial relationship. I am hopeful that they will demonstrate
that it can be worked out.
There is one thing that troubles all of us and that troubles me, and
that is that you can't put the Vice-President in a position where the
President will have to reverse him. If you put him in an executive
function on a regular basis where you have got the risk of him doing
something and then having the President go in there and turn it
around, well, that is a bad relationship. I am hopeful, myself, that
Senator Mondale will have a continuing input and relationship with
the President on many issues, rather than giving him one particular
job where you might find him in a position where the President might
have to turn him around.
In a couple of years I will come back over here and I will tell you
how it worked out.
MR. MITCHELL: With respect to Professor Schlesinger's observa-
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tions about the function of the Vice-President, I think he does and can
do a lot more than people give him credit for.
It so happens in this country we have had a long effort to try to
change the rules of the United States Senate so that we could limit
filibuster. It so happens that one of the most definitive and effective
rulings against filibuster was made by Vice-President Nixon when he
16
was the presiding officer in the United States Senate.
A more recent example comes to mind, in that when we were tied up
on a number of parliamentary problems in the Senate session which
just ended, the Vice-President of the United States, Mr. Rockefeller,
made a ruling which had the effect of clearing up a lot of the
complicated parliamentary underbrush with the support of the acting
Majority Leader, who was of a different party, Senator Byrd.
I think if we consider the fact that in the House of Representatives
the Speaker usually foregoes his right to vote on a number of important issues because he wants to be an objective example as a presiding
officer, in the Vice-President of the United States we have that already
as provided by the Constitution. He can only vote in the case of a tie,
and he is probably as close as you can get to a truly objective presiding
officer. But he must make rulings on parliamentary questions. Under
the present system, the presiding officer, whoever it might be, consults
the parliamentarian on what he should do, and in fact, it is the
parliamentarian who is ruling on important issues in the Senate of the
United States.
I think, among other things, that if we explore the possibility of
making the Vice-President of the United States a truly representative
presiding officer, truly vested with the power to make decisions as
Vice-President Nixon did with respect to the Senate rule and as
Vice-President Rockefeller did with respect to that parliamentary tangle
in which the Senate found itself, I think if we enhance that which is
16. Many illustrations of the limits on the Vice-President's authority as President of the
Senate have arisen in the context of attempts to invoke cloture. Apart from the strategic power he
wields in recognizing speakers during debate, his authority is clearly limited to ruling on
parliamentary questions. Any such ruling may be appealed to the Senate and reversed by a simple
majority. When Vice-President Humphrey ruled that a motion to cut off debate had passed after
a vote of 51-49, despite a Senate rule requiring approval by two-thirds of those present and
voting, an appeal was taken and the ruling was reversed. 115 Cong. Rec. 994-95 (1969). Similar
rulings by Vice-President Rockefeller are illustrative. See 121 Cong. Rec. S23339, S2340, S2347
(daily ed. Feb. 20, 1975). When the cloture rule was later changed, it was by formal Senate
resolution. S. Res. 4, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1975). See generally 121 Cong. Rec. S2333-34 (daily
ed. March 7, 1975); 103 Cong. Rec. 168 ff. (1957).
In the influential statement referred to, Vice-President Nixon acknowledged this limit on his
power, but went on to explain his own opinion that the view that the Senate could not amend its
traditional rules was unconstitutional. 103 Cong. Rec. 178-79 (1957).
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already there, the Vice-President will have a lot to do and he will be in
the Senate of the United States much more frequently to help cut the
Gordian knots that come there.
VOICE: Neil Rosnower, Barrister Magazine. Dean Reedy seems to
take a rather jaundiced view of the whole idea that legislative or
Constitutional change would or should take place.
Do you see any value in a body such as this and any changes that
should be put forth?
DEAN REEDY: My view is not quite as jaundiced as it seems. What
I am saying, fundamentally, is that unless you are willing to change
the Constitutional structure of the government itself, no meaningful
changes are going to be made as to the Vice-Presidency. You are not
going to get a meaningful change made unless you find some way of
dividing the executive powers or unless you change the Constitution in
some way as to provide a greater statutory relationship between the
legislative branch and the executive branch.
For the time being, I think we have to reconcile ourselves to the fact
that if we have and are going to continue with a Vice-President, it is
going to be a miserable job and there is nothing we can do except put
up with it.
PROF. KIRBY: He would continue presiding over the Senate.
DEAN REEDY: I think that is a total waste of time. I spent some
time making a survey of the tie votes, so-called, going back fifteen
years. There were an average of ten tie votes for the fifteen years. Of
those ten, there were only three on which the Vice-President had any
need to vote, because most ties are on a challenge to the administration
and, therefore, the administration wins, if it is a tie. Consequently,
that left him with about three meaningful acts over a period of fifteen
years to perform as presiding officer of the Senate.
SENATOR GRIFFIN: I might just add, very often when there is a
tie, the Vice-President isn't there.
DEAN REEDY: Of course, and it doesn't matter. Usually, a tie is on
the side of the administration. That is the point, seven out of ten
times.
MR. MITCHELL: But, George, what weight would you give to the
rulings of Vice-President Nixon, Vice-President JohnsonDEAN REEDY: Absolutely none, Clarence.
MR. MITCHELL: I would disagree with you.
DEAN REEDY: Clarence, if you take a look at the rules of the
Senate very carefully, the Vice-President rules according to the orders of
the Senate. He has no way of enforcing his rulings. If he wants, for
example, to send the sergeant-at-arms out to do a simple thing such as
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restoring order, he has to get a vote from the Senate in order to do it.
He does not have the elbow room that the Speaker has.
Mr. Nixon, by the way, did not make a ruling on civil rights. It was
not a ruling, to begin with.
MR. MITCHELL: The Nixon "statement," if you don't want to call
it a "ruling," was a thing that we have relied on, and it was different
from some other rulings.
I would say this, that I wasn't speaking generally. I was speaking of
this specific question with respect to the Senate rules. And I would say
that having been around there 30 years, I feel that there was great
historical impact. If we demean that, it seems to me we are not doing
justice to history, because these rulings have played an important part
in the Senate's taking a hard look at itself with respect to its filibustering.
SENATOR GRIFFIN: Clarence has talked about the function of the
Vice-President as the presiding officer of the Senate. As I have listened
to the discussion, it occurs to me that if we wanted to do something
about improving the matter of what the Vice-President does, we might
consider a very simple Constitutional amendment that might not be as
controversial as some of the other things, that is, to eliminate the
requirement that he be the presiding officer of the Senate. I think that
is a useless function which is only confusing; the idea that he has one
foot in the legislative branch and one foot in the executive branch is
somewhat ridiculous. It detracts from the likelihood or possibility that
the President will give him meaningful responsibilities in the executive
branch.
Our order of succession makes sense, as Arthur has suggested, for
acting Presidents to go down the line of Cabinet officers. I would put
forth the possibility that in eliminating the function of presiding officer
of the Senate, we might require or at least strongly recommend that
the Vice-President serve in one of the Cabinet positions. Why shouldn't
he be a person capable of administering one of the Cabinet positions,
selected as he is by the President? It seems to me that would give him a
significant role and a significant kind of function. If at some time the
President became displeased with how he was performing or
something-that would be the difficult point-he perhaps would shift
him to another Cabinet role that perhaps would not be as sensitive or
not as important. Or instead, it could be framed in such a way that he
would give him other functions that would be as important as a
Cabinet role. However, I would not suggest that the President be
required to name the Vice-President to a Cabinet post.
SENATOR SMITH:
I rather agree with Mr. Read that we must begin
by reassessing the functions of the Vice-President, to see whether they
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should be changed. As I said this morning, the Vice-President is in sort
of the position of being a waiter on the President and I think the
Vice-President could be very, very helpful to the President if there is
flexibility for him to do the things the President wants him to do,
especially the liaison between the Congress and the President, also the
good relations that could follow-I would not like to say "lobbying,"
but there is much of that which can be done if it is done informally.
MR. FEERICK: Professor Schlesinger has been quoted, and I think
he indicated as much this morning, that he thinks a great deal of what
the Vice-President does now is in the nature of make-work. Do you
share that view?
SENATOR SMITH: Well, no, I do not completely share that view,
but I think that would be all right if that is what the President wanted
done. I think the Vice-President must stay; we must have a VicePresident. I would go a little bit beyond that and say I feel that the
Vice-President should be elected, and nominated through a direct
primary and be one very close to the President. But I don't see any
reason why we should change the function.
MR. GOLDEN: I admire Professor Schlesinger's sense of humor, his
knowledge of history, and his pungent way of saying things, but I
dissent more than mildly from his dim view of the office itself. I felt
that perhaps we began to look at this problem from a completely
negative point of view, and I don't think the problem is a negative
one. I think we need some positive thinking here. Regardless of what
has happened in the past, regardless of all the funny stories about
Vice-Presidents and what they haven't done, the institution is with us.
Because it is with us, I do feel that the public wants it to be as
viable and as important as possible. I would hope that this panel today
might consider positive approaches to making the position more important to meeting the demands of the public. If indeed the Vice-President
is a heartbeat away from the Presidency, the public has a right to
know that the person holding that position is as talented as possible.
I would hope that we might this afternoon go into some constructive
suggestions as to what the Vice-President might do that he is not
doing, or what he should not do which he is doing. I know this is
contrary to some of the opinions expressed today. As bad as the office
may have been or as badly neglected as it may have been, I keep
feeling that since it is with us, since the country has grown so, since
there are so many responsibilities, that we might come up with some
constructive suggestions to make the office more dignified and more
important in many respects. I don't think that the problem is hopeless.
We are never going to cure cancer if we don't try to cure it, if we don't
investigate and study it in this world of research. I view this session
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today as one in which, with all of the faults we have had, with the
sorry history in some instances of the Vice-Presidency, as a time when
we should view it more positively and say, what can we do to make
the position more important, more viable, and I think that is what the
public wants.
PROF. SCHLESINGER:
Do you have any suggestions about specific
tasks that the Vice-President would assume after January 20th to
enhance the office?
MR. GOLDEN: It seems to me that now, with a nation of over 200
million as compared to what it was 75 years ago, just automatically the
responsibilities of the executive branch have increased, even if we were
to divide some of those responsibilities or delegate some. It would seem
to me that some important responsibilities-I can't name them-could
be delegated to the Vice-President, perhaps depending upon his background. If he is an experienced legislator, give him almost a full-time
assignment of working actively as a brake between the legislative and
executive branches of government.
SENATOR SMITH: Wouldn't you say that this was the reason for
giving the President flexibility to use the Vice-President as he found
necessary rather than setting it up by law?
MR. GOLDEN: I'm afraid the flexibility-well, the answer to your
question is "yes"-but I'm afraid the flexibility has been abused.
SENATOR SMITH: But that is not the fault of the system. It is the
fault of the people who are administering the system, isn't it?
MR. GOLDEN: Possibly so. Maybe it is the fault of the public in not
being militant enough about this.
DEAN REEDY: I think we could get into some rather grave difficulties by trying to solve what is essentially a political problem through
administrative means.
In the first place, I am not convinced that all of these deficiencies
exist. In a nation that has been in existence since 1789, we have been
selecting Vice-Presidents rather conventionally ever since the twelfth
amendment, and the country still stands; the country stands, with
Vice-Presidents good, bad or indifferent, just as our Presidents have
been good, bad or indifferent, and I think there is a tendency in
modern life where you feel you have to do something positive, don't
just stand there, do something, and sometimes it is really a virtue to
leave things where they are.
Let us take a look for a second at what we are talking about when
we are talking about enlarging the duties of the Vice-President, or
about handcuffing him or putting certain restrictions upon the manner
in which a President will select a Vice-President.
What we do when we select a President is to get a man who has the
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Constitutional obligation of running the United States Government. It
is very simple. The Constitution puts all executive powers in his
hands. Now, I think it is rather intolerable to do that to a man, but to
tell him before the convention that he must have a certain person or a
certain limited list of persons from which he is going to select a man
who will take over in case he passes away is another real problem.
You are really not going to do anything about the Vice-Presidency
unless you give him a place of power. You don't give him a place of
power if you find that all of these administrative tasks are going to be
very meaningless to him. Politicians don't care about administrative
work. They get no satisfaction out of it. That is not what they are
there for. They are there to handle power. That is what politics is, it is
the science of power. And the problem with the Vice-President is that
you don't have any power you can give him unless you are going to
take something away from the President. That is why I say you have
to change the Constitution if you are going to do it.
PROF. KIRBY: As to the argument that Presidents don't like to
share power, I don't believe it is fully that way, because they do share
power with staffers they trust. Erlichman and Haldeman shared
Nixon's powers to a great extent. The argument against a VicePresident sharing power is that the President can't dismiss him as he
can Cabinet members and staff members who displease him. He
cannot dismiss the Vice-President, but he can withdraw any power
that he has granted to him.
I think an ingenious President could come up with an executive
reorganization that would give the Vice-President something new, and
not nominal as has been done in the past, and later withdraw anything
that has been misused.
Rather than specify this power, I would say it should vary according
to the Vice-President. One who comes from Congress could and should
be used as a legislative link between the two branches. One with a
background in management, like Nelson Rockefeller, perhaps, could
be used in the executive branch in reorganization and continuing
studies for efficiency. One who had a background in foreign affairs
could be used as a Kissinger equivalent, perhaps.
But the main thing is to help the Vice-President continue to grow
and to be close to the President and to be able to step in if he succeeds,
which doesn't seem to be as well guaranteed under the present system
as it could be.
MR. GOLDSTEIN:

I wonder whether the evidence is completely

convincing that Vice-Presidents do wither during their time as VicePresident. I mean, it would seem to me that probably, largely based on
the Humphrey experience, or Nixon under Eisenhower, these were
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worthwhile educational experiences; in that sense, I wonder whether
Johnson's work on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
didn't have some effect on his views on civil rights when he became
President, and as for President Ford, I wonder whether his work in the
Privacy Commission as Vice-President wasn't a worthwhile thing.
What I am suggesting, I suppose, is: with the kind of relatively minor
responsibilities that the Vice-President has now in chairing different
commissions, whether there isn't some possibility for somebody to
grow in office.
Also, I would like to suggest a rather modest proposal. I was reading
Senator Humphrey's autobiography. 1 7 One of the things that intrigued
me was that he said when President Johnson got tired of hearing him
on Vietnam, he just stopped holding meetings of the National Security
Council because Humphrey was a member of the council and this was
a way of freezing Humphrey out of decision-making. It seems to me
one problem Vice-Presidents may have is that they are somewhat
dependent on the President's advisors for their information. And I
wonder whether it might be of some good to make sure that the
Vice-President had a suitable staff of his own people who were plugged
into the National Security Council, plugged into domestic affairs, so
that he wouldn't be really so much dependent on the Secretary of State
or Secretary of Defense but could really turn to his own people; and
what this might do is that, to the extent that a Vice-President is
involved in meetings in which decisions are taking place, it might have
the effect of offering a second person who not only has basically a view
of the political generalist in terms of decision-making, but somebody
who would also be more in a position to make worthwhile suggestions.
DEAN JACKSON: I think there is a good deal of wisdom in what
Mr. Kirby and Dean Reedy had to say about the change of process of
selection. I wanted to turn to Mr. Golden's remarks because I agreed
with his assumptions and disagreed with his conclusions.
Benjamin Franklin referred to the Vice-President as "His Superfluous Excellency." Nelson Rockefeller referred to the Vice-President as
"excess baggage, standby equipment, the reserve President."
My contention is that the Vice-Presidency, to paraphrase John
Nance Garner, might not be "worth more than a pitcher of warm
spit," but that it is better than no Vice-Presidency at all. Returning for
a moment to your suggestion, Mr. Golden, that you lay more administrative executive duties on the Vice-President, let me fill in what Joel
was suggesting a moment ago, that other than the Presidency of the
Senate, the Vice-President now does have several executive functions,
17.

H. Humphrey, The Education of a Public Man (1976).
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and I don't mean to be facetious by listing them, but other than the
statutory obligation to be a member of the National Security Council,
he also is required to serve on the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian
Institution, and as chairman of the National Council on Indian Opportunity, and of the National Aeronautics and Space Council. By Executive Order he is a member of the Domestic Council. Some VicePresidents have been named vice-chairman of the National Security
Council and of the Domestic Council. Other have been chairman of
the Domestic Council Committee on the Right to Privacy, or of the
National Center for Productivity and Quality of Working Life, or of
the National Committee on Water Quality.
I think Professor Schlesinger may have overstated his case in
terms of the history of the Vice-Presidency. Roosevelt did give
Garner and Wallace substantial administrative duties, including
chairmanship of the Economic Defense Board. Truman sought to
involve Barkley in all major policy decisions. Eisenhower gave Nixon
the chairmanship of the Operations Coordinating Board. Nixon
traveled widely on good-will missions, and he was concerned with
national security affairs. LBJ was chairman of the Peace Corps
Advisory Committee and of the committee on equal opportunity.
Agnew headed the new Office of Inter-Governmental Relations, and so
on.
That leads me to three observations about the office and what we
might propose or not propose about the administrative duties.
First, we should not unduly constrain the Chief Executive to
tailor-make the duties and the tasks of his Vice-President. The flexibility of allowing nearly total freedom of assignment is necessary to insure
the most appropriate match of Presidential needs with VicePresidential capabilities. I think a Vice-President ought to be viewed
as someone, an indispensable someone in our political system, who can
supplement and complement the skills and strengths and temperament
of the President.
However, the President should not be hampered or saddled with
statutory administrative responsibilities assigned to a Vice-President
whom he cannot remove, such as a Cabinet post.
Secondly, I think we should both acknowledge and respect the
indispensable utility of the office of Vice-President as an arm and
instrument of our political system. Vice-Presidents are elected-or at
least all but two have been elected-and as elected officials they carry
political legitimacy. Presidents increasingly need Vice-Presidents,
whether they use them for this purpose or not, as political "designated
hitters," to carry out tasks both short term and long range which
appointed officials either can't or should not fulfill, in my opinion. The
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question is not why shouldn't we abolish the office, an office without
substance, but how can we convince future Presidents to take greater
advantage of a relatively under-utilized political asset.
Lastly, I think we should welcome the opportunity-and I don't
think there are many on this panel who agree with me-I think we
should welcome the opportunity which the Vice-Presidency affords our
political system, that rare luxury of time and relative inactivity and
lack of substantial administrative or legislative tasks, and encourage
Presidents to view the Vice-Presidency quite deliberately as an unprecedented chance for on-the-job training.
Former Senator Eugene McCarthy refers to the Vice-President as
"the elected crown prince of the American political system." And
despite the fact that we are not a monarchy, I think the analogy is apt
because as the "crown prince" or at least the potential Chief Executive,
the Vice-President does wait. That is his fundamental duty, more
important than the Senate presidency or the political and administrative duties and the assets he provides. If this is the basic purpose, then
we should again seize the opportunity rather than retire the office out
of ambiguity and frustration. There is no adequate training ground for
the Presidency, we can agree on that. The only way to prove qualifications for the Presidency is to be a good President, but I submit the
Vice-Presidency offers a very useful training ground for the Presidency.
There has been a suggestion or inference that a Vice-President's
experience is frequently both frustrating and humiliating. But I contend the vehicle of the Vice-Presidency offers the system the hidden
chance to train and groom future Chief Executives, and I might add
only somewhat facetiously, if the Vice-Presidency teaches some humility and exposes one to some frustration, those are wise and realistic
attributes that a future President should acquire early in life.
MR. MITCHELL: I accept the thesis that the Vice-Presidency is here
to stay. And we have the duty of trying to make it meaningful to the
people.
After the Vice-President is in office, I think there are ways in which
we can divide the functions of this government so that the VicePresident can have a meaningful input.
I think it was a disgrace that after President Roosevelt died, we
learned that President Truman didn't know anything about the socalled Manhattan Project, which was the atom bomb at the time,
while Jimmy Byrnes who was given by President Roosevelt the office
of Assistant to the President as head of the Office of War Mobilization
did know all about it. It so happens Jimmy Byrnes couldn't have
gotten elected dogcatcher in my neighborhood but Truman could have.
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A lot of these persons who get to be the head of the Office of
Management and Budget or who get to be heads of some kind of great
domestic mobilization program have never run for public office. They
have no rapport with the people, and they don't know what they are
doing most of the time so you can't expect them to have the confidence
of the people.
I think, because I knew Vice-President Agnew-although I didn't
agree with him, didn't vote for him-but the fact of life is I would
have had much more confidence in his political judgments, because I
happen to live in the state where he grew up and where he got into
office-I would have had much more confidence in his political judgments than I would in some of the other people who were appointed to
the Cabinet, for example.
Now, I feel that Presidents tend to become preoccupied with foreign
policy. And because they do, they delegate to people who are not
elected officials the responsibilities of handling domestic affairs. I think
it could be worked out in a way that the President could delegate to
the Vice-President a really meaningful position handling domestic
affairs, and we should expect the people that I am associated with and
some of whom voted in the recent election are expecting that in the
Carter Administration there will be delegated to the Vice-President
meaningful responsibilities in the domestic field. . . . I would say
further-and maybe this is the last thing I should say-that if that
doesn't happen, those who happen to have been black in this nation
and voted so overwhelmingly for a Southern President will feel that
they have been betrayed. And my honest opinion is that they would
have been betrayed, because to be truthful about it I do not believe
that Governor Carter could have attracted the amount of black votes
that he got if he hadn't had Mondale on that ticket, and therefore, I
feel that we who expect things of him are not expecting any figurehead
operation up there.
So I trust very much that if any report is made on this meeting, it
will be clear to all who read it that I not only think that it is realistic
for the President to delegate meaningful functions to the VicePresident, but I think it ought to start with this administration.
MR. FEERICK: Would you leave that area of delegation to the good
will of the President or would you suggest that we have some additional statutory or Constitutional provisions, if that should be necessary, that mandate it?
MR. MITCHELL:
I think that we could do it two ways. I think we
could do it with the intelligent discretion of the President. And I think
that to the extent it would be necessary to implement it by legislation,
it could be short-term legislation for the duration of the incumbency of
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that particular President, with the understanding that it could be
revised if another President thought about it a different way. But we
should expect that the President would have enough discretion to
assign meaningful duties, and as I said, if necessary, buttress it with
legislation which he could formulate if he cared to and get it passed in
Congress.
PROF. SCHLESINGER: I am sorry that Mr. Kirbo is not present to
hear Clarence's eloquent statement, which I heartily endorse. I must
confess this whole discussion since lunch seems to be taking place in an
atmosphere of total unreality. We have had all of these admirable
thoughts as to what Presidents might do to give meaning to the office
of the Vice-Presidency. But the fact is that we have existed as an
independent nation for 200 years, we have had Presidents and VicePresidents for all but a dozen years of that period, and no President
has ever done this. We have had intelligent, responsible, sensitive
Presidents, and the serious questions which you gentlemen of the
American Bar Association must address yourselves to is why is it that
no President has ever done any of these things and how to force
Presidents to do it, accepting the Chairman's assumption, from which
I earlier dissented, that we proceed this afternoon on the basis that the
office continues.
Now, it is just not accidental, obviously, that every President of the
United States has had the possibility to do these splendid things and no
President has ever done it. I don't see how you can all go on in this
carefree way "let's make him this, let's make him that." The serious
question is why no one has ever done it. The Presidents, on the whole,
have probably even been more intelligent than the people gathering
around this table. They thought of it; yet they have not done it. This is
clearly the critical question.
For all of us to sit around and for the American Bar Association to
say, "Oh, yes, let's delegate him this and make him that"? There is
nothing more poignant
and pathetic than to list the list of offices Mr.
18
Jackson read earlier.
Nelson Rockefeller is the most recent beneficiary of all these great
pleasures, and I suppose the most frustrated man in the United States
for this last year has been Nelson Rockefeller. When you put the most
hyperactive man in the country in the most meaningless job in the
country, you are bound to get frustration. He had all of these opportunities, and so on; why was he frustrated? Because he discovered how
empty all these functions were.
The question that Mr. Jackson raises is that this humiliation might
18.

See p. 746 supra.
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be good. Unfortunately-again, I keep invoking the historical
record-Vice-Presidents have been humiliated, and when they become
Presidents they proceed to inflict even more humiliation on their
Vice-Presidents.
Theodore Roosevelt complained about how badly he was treated
by McKinley. However badly McKinley treated him, it was nothing to
the way Theodore Roosevelt treated Charles W. Fairbanks, or how
badly Eisenhower treated Nixon-and Nixon deeply resented it, didn't
enjoy being Vice-President; but that was nothing to the way Nixon
treated Agnew, and subsequently, Ford.
I think George Reedy would agree that among the Presidential/
Vice-Presidential relations, on the whole John Kennedy was a very
considerate President. He liked the Vice-President, made an effort to
include him in the discussions, and so on, but Lyndon Johnson by 1963
was a gloomy, wounded man. And then when Lyndon Johnson
became President, far from having benefited by this humility, what he
did to Hubert Humphrey we all know.
I think the approach, rather than sketching out these utopian fantasies about what Presidents might do, is to confront the reason
why they have never done it.
I think the reason why they have never done it is deeply rooted first
in their sense of Constitutional obligation to maintain control of their
power, and second in what I discussed this morning about the psychic
problems of having someone around who is waiting for you to die. I
think these are problems so deep that they can't be overcome by our
drawing up blueprints.
MR. FEERICK: I would like to give George Reedy a chance to
respond on this historical record.
DEAN REEDY: Historically, Arthur is absolutely correct. I thought,
myself, that President Kennedy was rather generous to Vice-President
Johnson. But that didn't mean that Vice-President Johnson appreciated it in the slightest.
And I think that what this goes back to is a certain failure here to
fully comprehend the political psychology. I think that, in a way, we are
getting too obsessed with administration and we think of "meaningful
work" in terms of filling out reports and giving orders, which means
absolutely nothing to a political personality. The simple point is that
the President is the only man in the Federal Government that has the
right to say "yes" or "no" and make it stick. And unless you are willing
to give the Vice-President some circumstances in which he can say
"yes" when the President says "no" and the Vice-President's "yes" will
stick, you might as well forget it. That's really the problem. It is right
there. We are thinking too much of the Presidency in terms of an
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administrative job and really it is not much of an administrative job.
And when you try to hedge it around with administrative procedures,
all you are really going to do is to invite Presidents to find ways of
getting around them.
And as a parallel, suppose the President had to submit a list of
candidates for Vice-President. If I were Mr. Carter, what I would
have done is to send the following list: Otto Passman, George Wallace,
Wayne Hayes, Walter Mondale. You have got to have a certain
amount of realism about this, because assuming you can get around
the other problems, that is what is going to happen to them.
I heard one remark here earlier about how Humphrey got frozen out
of decision-making by bypassing Security Council meetings. Who the
devil ever thought decisions were made in the Security Council? The
Security Council is just where they meet so they can announce the
decision to the public. Johnson didn't have to forego Security Council
meetings to freeze Humphrey out. All he had to do was not invite
Humphrey to the lunch the day before with the two or three people he
really listened to. And if you pass a law that says Humphrey has to
attend that luncheon, then what they will do is have a cocktail party
beforehand, and you have a Never-Never Land here. You are dealing
with political realities and you are trying to use administrative remedies and they do not apply.
MR. FEERICK: Governor Peabody?
Gov. PEABODY: Mr. Chairman, I congratulate you and the panel
for holding this meeting, because in my opinion, for the first time at
least since I have been involved in the problem in the last four years,
we are really getting down to some truths which are not often
discussed because there are very few students in this particular area,
sad to say; therefore, there has not been deep discussion and involvement by the American public. But some real insights are coming
through to me as a result of this trade of ideas which are being well
expressed on both sides.
I have not, as a former Governor, conceived of a Governor sharing
his executive power with anyone. And I don't want the President of
the United States to do so either. The Founding Fathers of our
Constitution, both in Massachusetts, who was John Adams, and in the
nation, decided that all executive power should be in the Chief
Executive, and believe me, that is where it belongs and it cannot be
shared effectively. And this effort to keep the Vice-President busy is
just that, to keep him from being humiliated and as an act of kindness
and it doesn't really train him for the office in that respect. I think
George Reedy has said this obsession with administrative responsibilities doesn't make him feel at all better. I recall when I was
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Governor that the subject of capital punishment came up in parts of
my administration. I had not made my mind up while I was a
candidate for Governor, but my running mate, the Lieutenant Governor, had. He campaigned all out for abolition of capital punishment. I
finally made the decision to go for abolition and so I invited him in and
I asked him if he would be my legislative liaison with the Legislature
in carrying this out. And he said, "I would like to think about it and I
will get back to you." I am still waiting.
The fact is that Vice-Presidents or Lieutenant Governors or whatnot
don't get their kicks out of this administrative responsibility. They are
politicians. They are, as George said, dealing in the exercise of power,
and if we want to bring them along, we ought to put them where the
power is but in a way where it will not affect the President of the
United States in the operation of the government.
Our Founding Fathers were wise in that respect. The only duties
that they gave to the Vice-President were legislative duties. They were
meager to be sure, and so meager that every Vice-President has been
frustrated, and indeed, in the nineteenth century we rarely had a
quality Vice-President because nobody wanted to run for the office.
SENATOR GRIFFIN:

We don't want him running the Senate either.

Gov. PEABODY: It used to be said that a man had two sons, one
went to sea and the other became Vice-President, and neither was
heard from again.
I suggest that one way to bring the Vice-President along is to give
him further duties in the Senate of the United States, to give him a full
legislative vote, to let him express the national conscience on Capitol
Hill, writing the legislation he deems needed by the nation which may
be obstructed by regionalism or the chairman, legislation which he
deems important, and let him work and strive in that direction.
The Speaker of the House is third in line for the Presidency and does
have the opportunity; why do we deny it to the second in line?
The argument may be made, "Well, then you are creating another
seat of power as opposed to the President," and this is something that
we must be concerned about. For some reason, in this spot the
argument might be, he should be loyal to the President. We have just
been concerned about the imperial Presidency. Today, after Watergate, as Arthur said to me at lunch, the Presidency is indestructible
and is not going to be destroyed by putting in the Senate a Senator-atlarge who can carry on these duties, who can educate himself far more
as to the duties and responsibilities of being President of the United
States, in such an office which is a seat of power than he can
elsewhere. I will leave to the Senators to decide whether he should be
President of the Senate or where else to put him, but let him have a
vote.
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MR. YOUNG: I listened with interest to Dean Jackson's laundry list
of statutory positions. I have never seen that full list before. I tend to
agree more with Dr. Schlesinger that the list really hasn't much meat.
However, I don't think this exhausts the possibilities of the VicePresident in his current role. He does have another role. This also
involves us in something that Dean Jackson mentioned. He suggested
that the Vice-President become more of a political asset to the President.
My feeling is he is already too much involved in a political role. I
can't speak as to perception in Washington of what Vice-Presidents
have been in recent years; but as someone who views the Washington
scene from afar, my impression of recent Vice-Presidents is that one
after another they have served as cheerleaders for the various Presidents of the United States. They seem to be constantly on tour, making
speeches, saying things such as: "He is the only President we have and
let's support him." I think it is all right to be a cheerleader for a
President, but it has become embarrassing for some Vice-Presidents.
They have continued beyond all necessary and appropriate means to
try to apologize for various administrations which have been falling
flat on their face. This period of the outspoken Vice-President dates
back to Henry Wallace's experience, about 1941, which is also about
the time that Vice-Presidents began to take on additional responsibilities.
Wallace, for example, was very outspoken during World War Il. He
went so far as to call critics of FDR fascists. He said at one point,
"They are grooming fascists in the United States." These were people,
basically, who were disagreeing with FDR's prosecution of the war.
We have seen this down through the years, "nattering nabobs of
negativism" in Agnew days, and Humphrey who went, I think,
beyond what was appropriate. I believe Vice-Presidents have damaged
their credibility and reduced their likelihood of going on to the White
House by the role they played, and it seems to weaken their credibility.
We have had questions asked: "Mr. Vice-President, was that speech
written in the White House?"
"No, I wrote it myself." Then somebody from the White House says,
"Yes, that speech was written there and handed to him and he was
asked to read it."
I believe, therefore, we need to get Vice-Presidents out of the
political arena. In the case of Ford, I think almost every night that he
was Vice-President during a period of about eight months, he was on
the road defending the Nixon Administration. In that case it might
have been justified up to a point, because the Republican Party during
this extended period was in very much a state of disarray, and Ford
was one of the few national figures who was certainly free of the
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Watergate scandal. Generally speaking, I don't know why VicePresidents are in this role. I think they should get out of it. But I don't
think the solution is to get back to performing the duties that Dean
Jackson named. There are only two or three substantive duties there.
Most of them are meaningless, like serving on the Smithsonian Board.
I would say if we can't find anything else for the Vice-President to
do-and I agree with Dean Reedy, he can't share executive power-if
nothing else, he can go to the Oval Office, sit there at the right hand of
the President, and observe on a day-to-day basis the flow of work that
comes in, the problems that are being grappled with, the various
people that the President sees; and I think in the absence of anything
else, that might be the most logical solution.
MR. SPANN:
So far as giving the Vice-President more duties with
regard to the Senate, that doesn't spell itself out in my mind. I do not
hear what those duties really may be. Giving him a vote I don't think
means a whole lot. He has the vote, in case of a tie. About the only
difference between that and if he were a member of the body is that a
member of the body presiding would normally have a vote to make or
break a tie; he can break a tie, he can't make it. I don't see very much
difference in giving him the vote on every issue.
I agree with the thought that he is part of the executive department,
and I don't think you ought to give greater power in the executive
department over the legislative department. So that I do not know
what these duties are that would produce the training.
DEAN REEDY: There is one question that I would like to address to
Governor Peabody: How do you dispose of what I think is the biggest
single objection to your proposal, which is, do you think the Senate of
the United States would ever permit the President of the United States
to have a vote in the Senate of the United States? This is what you
would be doing if you gave the Vice-President a vote.
Gov. PEABODY: I think you probably are quite correct.... But as
I say, we are not working for reform today. We are working for reform
over a period of time. And if there is enough popular support for this
proposal, I think that a lot of Senators themselves might support it.
DEAN REEDY: Let me make one more remark. I will never forget
what happened to Lyndon Johnson when, as Vice-President, he tried
to attend Democratic caucuses.
Gov. PEABODY: I would say you have to amend the Constitution
and, of course, you need the Senate's vote for that, I agree.
SENATOR GRIFFIN: I don't want to be the only voice on this-I
would like to hear what Margaret has to say-but one of my jobs is to
count votes around the Senate and I think it will be a long, long time
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before there is a two-thirds vote in the Senate to give the VicePresident any more power than he has got.
SENATOR SMITH: I can't see the value of it. I think his only
function now is, to break a tie. I think this is a very important point. I
remember when some of those Vice-Presidents stayed around for
weeks waiting for a tie vote so that they could break it. That has been
a very, very important part of it.
Do you remember the time that we had that vote with a hundred
people on the floor and there was a 50/50 vote, and, of course, it was
defeated because of the tie. Vice-President Agnew came in and voted
just the same, but it was completely meaningless.
MR. MITCHELL: Mr. Chairman, I don't think the role of the
Vice-President needs to be enlarged. I just think it needs to be taken
seriously. I think it is time in this country that we face up to the fact
that neither the Senate, the President, nor the House of Representatives should be above the Constitution of the United States. Of course
the Senate is going to try to defend all of its prerogatives.
If I had been a member of the Senate when Vice-President Johnson
attempted to preside at a caucus, I would have welcomed the opportunity to share with the experiences of a Vice-President who had been in
the Senate as long as he had. And, indeed, when we were working for
the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Bill, President Johnson had almost
a daily input, and perhaps the most eloquent evidence of the input that
President Johnson had in the Senate of the United States came from
Senator Richard Russell, who got on the floor of the United States
Senate and said what President Johnson had been doing to influence
the results and also told me personally what he had done.
The change-about by Senator Dirksen on the Fair Housing legislation and the Civil Rights Bill itself is evidence of the effectiveness of
the intervention of the President into the affairs of the United States
Senate.
So I would say, to me it is a concept that is entirely constitutional,
that there should be input from the President of the United States in
the United States Senate, and it is certainly reasonable to me to think
that the Vice-President would be a channel for that rather than some
of those White House lobbyists who operate around in the House and
Senate and have to go hat in hand to get things done. It seems to me
the dignity of the office of Vice-President as the Constitution has
conceived it would make it possible for him to have an orderly meeting
with members of either House to help forward the President's legislative program. I don't see anything unreasonable about that. I feel that
there is just too much of an attitude in this country of people setting off
little islands of power that they think are exclusively theirs even if it is
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not in the national interest. I think it is in the national interest for
everybody to work together. If it means incorporating the wisdom of a
Vice-President in the legislative process, as presently permitted under
the Constitution, then I think we ought to find ways of doing it.
PROF. KIRBY: I hate to be the technical Constitutionalist, but I
must mention an objection to making the Vice-President the 101st
Senator on Constitutional grounds which I know some Senators would
raise. I will ask Senator Griffin to confirm this. The Constitution states
that no body will be deprived of its representation without its consent.
It has been proposed to give the District of Columbia two Senators
from time to time, and that always runs into sizeable argument, or
argument of a sizeable number of Senators, that it would deny this
equality. When that argument is raised, I have never heard a very
persuasive answer against it.
SENATOR GRIFFIN:

I suppose if we amended the Constitution to

provide more powersPROF. KIRBY: This is the un-amendable provision of the Constitution. 19
SENATOR GRIFFIN: Speaking to Clarence's point, there is not, of
course, any question that the President does have a lot of input on the
Hill in the legislative process, and he can choose to try to exercise that
through his White House lobbyists or he can, and does in many
instances, use the Vice-President. Depending on the personality and
the compatibility of the particular person that is in that office, the
relationship to the Senate and so forth, he is more or less effective.
But if we are talking about giving the Vice-President more real
power rather than just a legislative liaison function, then I think that
you run into the jealous guardians of the separation-of-powers doctrine
who see the Senate and the House-and, I think, rightfully so-as an
entirely separate branch of the government, and I think that it would
be a long, long wait before the Senate would approve any kind of
legislation or Constitutional provision that would actually give the
Vice-President more power in the Legislature.
VOICE: My name is Bill Lynch of NBC. I would like to explore
with Senator Griffin his suggestion that perhaps the Vice-President
could be a minister without portfolio in the Cabinet. Is this the kind of
thing that would narrow the selection process, owing to specialized
skills that such a person might need to have in order to perform
adequately the function of Transportation Secretary or Secretary of the
19. The power of Congress and the states to amend the Constitution is limited by the proviso
that "no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate." U.S.
Const. art. V.

